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1- INTRODUCTION 
In the main sport leagues throughout the world, the sport talent market is widely 
intermediated. The main feature of this intermediation is that the supply side of the market is 
fairly concentrated. In the United States in 2010, of the 1728 National Football League 
professional players, 664 were represented by one of the 7 top agents (an average of 94 
players per agent).1 In Europe, half of the 1945 footballers of the main European leagues are 
represented by only the 83 top football agents and one quarter are represented by only 24 of 
them (an average of 20 players per agent) (Poli and Rossi, 2012). Considering other sports, 
86% of the 3456 labor contracts signed between 2002 and 2010 in French professional 
basketball leagues involved one of the only 72 licensed agents (Brocard, 2012). Those 
stylized facts show that sports agents play a central role in the sport talent market and that 
they have a significant market power. As an example, during the 2010-11 season, the 
payments made by English Premier League football clubs to agents reached a record 71,87M£ 
(86M€).2 
This paper first analyzes the role of these middlemen negotiators in bilateral search 
economies such as the labor market of professional athletes. Then, we address the currently 
debated issue of the appropriateness of regulating the way sports agents are remunerated. 
A substantial theoretical literature has considered different roles that middlemen can 
play and examined the conditions under which middlemen emerge. Yavas (1992) first 
clarified between two types of intermediaries: marketmakers and matchmakers. A 
marketmaker corresponds to the traditional definition of intermediaries such as retailers who 
set an ask price and a bid price, at which they sell and buy for their own account. A 
matchmaker, on the other hand, does not buy or sell, but rather matches two agents, a buyer 
with a seller. Common examples are employment agencies or real estate brokers. Those two 
concepts can be brought together as Yavas (2001) considers that matchmakers are 
marketmakers that can provide the service of immediacy. The literature analyzes the reasons 
of the emergence of middlemen with reference to two features of search markets: transaction 
costs and adverse selection problems. One branch of the literature justifies intermediation by 
the presence of trading frictions when actors must search. In Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) 
and Gehrig (1993), middlemen extract a surplus by reducing the time period that actors wait 
for a transaction to occur thanks to an initial advantage given by their ability to match. 
Shevchenko (2000) and Johri and Leach (2002) have enriched the basic Rubinstein and 
 
 
Wolinsky model through the introduction of heterogeneous goods and idiosyncratic 
preferences. They show that middlemen pull some revenues by holding inventories. Another 
series of papers explains that the role of middlemen is based upon the adverse selection 
problem that arises when product quality is not immediately observable. In this context, 
middlemen emerge by acquiring, at some cost, the ability to verify the quality of goods. In 
Biglaiser (1993), a middleman takes part in a larger number of transactions and stays in the 
market for several time periods, so that he has more incentive to become an expert in 
detecting and revealing the real quality of goods. Li (1998) shows that this ability to hold 
better information has a reputation effect that leads to a situation where the quality of the 
middleman’s goods is more predictable. 
In the aforementioned literature, no interest is given to the regulation of middlemen, and 
especially to the legal framework of contracts they sign with their constituents. However, 
sport is a field where the regulation of intermediaries is highly developed and currently 
debated. FIFA defines sports agents as intermediaries who, for a fee, introduce players to 
clubs with a view to negotiating or renegotiating an employment contract.3 Their 
remuneration is governed by the different local regulations which, in particular, contain the 
rules that lay down the party which is supposed to pay the commission to the middleman.  
At the international level, the comparison between the current rules which enable clubs 
or players to pay the commission indicates an extreme heterogeneity. Rosner (2004) points 
out that in the United States, the principal-agent relationship is considered under the risk of 
conflicts of interest as the Law of Agency indicates: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is 
subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters 
connected with this agency".4 As an illustration, in the North-American closed sport leagues, 
players associations have succeeded in introducing in the Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(CBA) which include sports agents regulation, a rule prohibiting payments from clubs to the 
intermediaries (Shropshire and Davis, 2008). In particular, the NBA CBA states that "No 
team shall make any direct or indirect payment of any money, property, investments, loans, or 
anything else of value for fees or otherwise to an agent, attorney, or representative of a 
player"5 and the NFL CBA provides by the same recommendation.6 Thus, in North American 
professional leagues, we can consider that intermediaries are paid by their main constituent, 
the players.7 
In Europe, the study ordered by the European Commission in 2009 shows that the 
existing mechanisms for remunerating sports agents are fairly heterogeneous (agents paid by 
the player, agents paid by the club, or a mixed commission payment) and concluded that 
 
 
harmonization is necessary in presence of international transactions.8 In fact, in terms of the 
number of sports agents concerned, the "agent-paid-by-club" mechanism has proved to be the 
most common in Europe, even when the principal represented by the middleman is the player, 
and whatever the provisions contained in the various regulations. As an interesting European 
example, the evolution of the regulation in France shows that the question of which party 
should pay the agent has been at the core of the discussions for a long time. The French 
legislation used to establish that the agent might only be paid by the party that has given him a 
mandate to act on its behalf. But this rule was circumvented with clubs paying intermediaries 
instead of players.9 This situation led two parliamentary reports aimed at enhancing sports 
agents regulation to address the question of their remuneration and those reports both 
concluded that enabling clubs to pay would make sense, convincing regulators to adapt the 
rules in 2010.10 In fact, the Code of Sport now provides for the possibility of an agreement 
between the agent and the parties mentioned in the contract to have the commission entirely 
or partially paid by the clubs.11 Nevertheless, this evolution has, ever since, been highly 
questioned. The French Ministry of Sport stated in the latest sport-related parliamentary report 
in 2011: "It seems inadmissible to me that clubs pay agents who are players’ constituents".12 
This position is clearly shared at the European level by the General Secretary of the Board of 
Directors of UEFA who stated in 2011: "I agree on who should pay the agent: the player that 
uses the agent".13 Therefore, in Europe, we can consider that, in practice, middlemen are paid 
by clubs, even when they represent players, but that this situation could change in the near 
future. 
The paper examines the two rules currently open to debate: the "player-pays" principle 
and the "club-pays" principle. We evaluate how each of these rules affects social welfare. In 
fact, depending on the context, we can identify the most desirable measure even if we show 
that imposing the best rule is not necessarily welfare-improving and that the best decision for 
the regulator can in certain circumstances be the laissez-faire. Therefore, the paper also 
addresses the question of the appropriateness of setting a legal framework specifying the 
payer in contracts signed by intermediaries.  
Our benchmark model (without regulation) is in line with Yavas (1994). We use a two-
stage game with three participants. The middleman is a matchmaker. Intermediation may arise 
because middleman has a more effective matching technology than the two primary agents, 
the player searching for a club and the club seeking to sign a player. At the first stage, the 
middleman selects his pricing policy. At the second stage, facing the fees charged by the 
intermediary, the player and the club simultaneously select either to begin individual 
 
 
searching on their own account, or to go directly to the middleman. Matching is certain if and 
only if both primary agents choose to go directly to the middleman. If this is not the case, the 
likelihood of a successful match depends on the individual search intensities of both agents 
(the time spent on the search, the expenses incurred…). If the match fails in this first step, the 
agents can still go to the middleman after they have already searched. In this case, each of the 
three participants incurs the cost of the lag period and their respective surpluses get 
discounted. It follows that the discount factor is a key parameter in the decision to avoid or 
choose the middleman in the first step. This parameter also matters in the middleman’s choice 
of pricing policy. Indeed, if the intermediary is impatient to receive his remuneration (if his 
discount factor is low), he may decide to charge lower prices in order to induce agents not to 
search on their own account. The second parameter that plays a significant role in the model is 
the distribution of the bargaining power between the player and the club which depends on the 
sport, on the league’s structure and on the segment of the talent market considered. This 
parameter determines the gross profit of each side when the two agents share the gain from 
the match. It follows that a change in the bargaining power distribution affects the choice of 
each agent to skip or not the middleman at the first step. When an agent does skip the 
intermediary at stage one, the change in turn affects the agent’s search intensity.  
Setting rules that determine who should pay the middleman’s commission will simply 
result in choosing constraints to be imposed on the policy choice of the latter at the first stage. 
As a result, the equilibrium behaviors of agents will adjust accordingly. We assess the 
consequences using welfare enhancing criterion. Our main results are as follows. In the 
process of choosing between the "player-pays" principle and the "club-pays" principle, the 
most appropriate measure consists in designating the party with the lesser bargaining power to 
pay the middleman’s commission. Yet, it is not strictly dominant that setting the best rule will 
improve welfare. In fact, the welfare is improved only if the discount factor is relatively high, 
or if the relative bargaining powers of the player and the club are very asymmetric.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Using a backward 
reasoning, Sections 3 and 4 describe the equilibrium behaviors of the three participants in the 
benchmark situation. Section 5 introduces a legal rule designating the payer of the middleman 
and evaluates the effects of such regulation, using the welfare as the criterion. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper and proposes directions for future work. All proofs of the 
lemma and the propositions are in the Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
2- THE MODEL 
We consider a problem of matching between two agents, namely a seller and a buyer. The 
seller refers to a player searching for a club and the buyer is a club seeking to sign a player. 
Each agent can access the service of an intermediary, called the middleman.14 
We use a two-stage model of complete information. At the first stage, the middleman 
selects his pricing policy. At the second stage, the seller and the buyer learn the cost of the 
intermediation services. Each agent then has to choose between beginning individual 
searching on his own account or going directly to the middleman. With the latter option, the 
agent is no longer allowed to search on his own account. Each agent makes his decision 
unaware of the decision of the other agent. Depending on the decisions made by both agents, 
the second stage can include one or two steps. More specifically: 
- if both agents directly sign a contract with the middleman, the game ends at the first step; 
- if both agents skip the middleman, the game is concluded at the first step if the individual 
searches lead to a successful matching whereas if the individual searches are not fruitful, the 
agents can still use the middleman’s services in a second step; 
- if one agent chooses to start the search on his own account while the other signs with the 
middleman, the game ends at the first step if the matching is successful and the middleman 
collects his commission from the only agent he is under contract with, whereas if the agent’s 
individual search does not lead to a match, this agent can in turn access the service of the 
intermediary in a second step. 
In the absence of a match, the profits of both agents equal zero. The match has a value 
V for the buyer. This surplus is shared depending on the relative bargaining power of each 
agent. The seller gets the portion ωSV (i.e. the buyer pays ωSV to the seller) and the buyer 
keeps the portion ωBV = V – ωSV. In order to alleviate the technical aspects of the paper, we 
consider that V equals one monetary unit. It follows that the respective profits of the seller 
and the buyer are ωS and ωB monetary units with 0 < ωi < 1, i = S,B and ωS + ωB = 1 monetary 
unit.  
The remuneration of the intermediary can be based on the amount ωS of the transaction 
but other options are possible. For example, Yavas (1994) considers that the middleman takes 
the amount käωS to the seller and the amount käωB to the buyer. In our model, we choose a 
simple yet general formulation: the middleman takes the amount KS to the seller and the 
amount KB to the buyer. This formulation is general since once the amounts KS and KB are 
 
 
chosen by the middleman, the latter can, for example, draft a contract in which these 
commissions are presented as function of the amount of the transaction ωS.15 
 
Let eS ≥ 0 and eB  ≥ 0 refer to the individual search intensities of the seller and of the 
buyer. The likelihood of a match without the involvement of the middleman depends on the 
individual search intensities of both agents. Let Φ(eS,eB) denote this probability and assume 
that 
 
Φ(eS,eB) = eS + eB  if  0 ≤ (eS + eB) ≤ 1   and   Φ(eS,eB) = 1  if  (eS + eB) >1 . (1) 
 
The matching function we retained enables one agent who is not searching to be contacted 
with a positive probability by the second agent who is searching. We can also notice that the 
additive form of the function Φ(eS,eB) makes the efforts eS and eB strategically independent.  
This hypothesis leads to tractable explicit solutions and makes it easier to present economic 
intuitions for the results. Let us point out that despite the hypothesis, the seller and the buyer 
are still in a strategic interaction. Indeed, each agent benefits from the positive externality 
induced by the individual search of the other agent, so that the expected payoff of an agent 
depends on the option chosen at the first step by the other agent (between an individual search 
and the use of intermediation services). However, there is no strategic interaction when agents 
decide about search intensities. In Appendix B, we consider a matching technology involving 
mutual interdependences so that the optimal search intensity of one agent depends on the 
search intensity of the other agent. The results show that the conclusions of the paper are not 
conditional on the additive form of the function Φ(eS,eB). 
 
The individual search yields a cost to each agent 
 
C(ei) = ei2    i = S,B. (2) 
 
If both agents go to the middleman, the latter holds enough information to succeed in 
matching the agents with certainty. The cost of this operation is way lower than the cost of 
individual searches. In order to simplify, we assume that the cost of such a matching for the 
middleman is equal to zero.  
 
The convenient way to deal with multi-stage games is to use discounted payoffs. Then, 
let δ, 0 < δ ≤ 1, refer to the discount factor, common to the three agents. The usual 
interpretation for the discount factor is as follows. The player has a time preference by which 
 
 
he ascribes less importance to the payoff in the second step. If δ tends to 0 the player is very 
impatient and vice versa if δ tends to 1 a lag period does not bother the player so that he 
ascribes the same weight to the payoff in the second step and to the payoff in the first step. 
Another possible interpretation is the following: believing that "tomorrow is uncertain" the 
player thinks that there exists a probability (1 – δ) that the strategic encounter will end after 
the first step and that the second step will take place with a probability δ less than 1. 
 
The two following sections address the determination of the equilibrium behaviors of 
the three participants. We use a backward reasoning. First, we analyze the different possible 
configurations of the second stage and we identify the ones which are likely to belong to an 
equilibrium path. Then, we undertake the first stage from the middleman’s point of view and 
determine the fees KS and KB solution. Finally, unwinding the game gives the subgame 
perfect equilibria. 
 
3- THE POSSIBLE CONFIGURATIONS AT THE SECOND STAGE 
Let Y refer to the individual choice of an agent to sign directly with the middleman and N the 
choice to search on one’s own account. Four configurations are possible at the first step of the 
second stage: the configuration (N,N) where both agents skip the services of the intermediary 
and choose to begin with an individual search, the configurations (Y,N) and (N,Y) where one 
of the agents directly signs a contract with the middleman (the seller in the first configuration, 
the buyer in the second) while the other agent searches on his own account, and lastly the 
configuration (Y,Y) where both agents choose to directly sign a contract with the middleman.  
In the configuration (Y,Y), the game ends at the first step since agents are matched by 
the middleman. In the three other configurations, the matching may be unsuccessful in the 
first step and, in turn, there is a second step where an agent who is not yet under contract has 
to decide to sign with the middleman or to refuse its services. So, in case of an unsuccessful 
matching, we must consider different scenarios at the second step for each configuration 
obtained at the first step: (a) (N,N) is followed by (N,N),(Y,N),(N,Y) or (Y,Y), (b) (Y,N) is 
followed by (Y,N) or (Y,Y), (c) (N,Y) is followed by (N,Y) or (Y,Y). Such a high number of 
subgames involving two asymmetric players would imply fastidious analysis that, 
additionally, should be conducted twice (in the absence of legal rules and under a regulation 
policy). In order to simplify, we consider that if the individual searches are not fruitful at the 
first step, the matching is possible at the second step only through the services of the 
 
 
intermediary. Naturally, if the cost of the intermediation is too high, agents can still skip the 
middleman. A necessary and sufficient condition for them not to skip the middleman - at the 
last step of the game - is that the offered contract increases their wealth. This implies that the 
fees KS and KB set up in the contract satisfy the individual rationality constraints:16 
 
(IRS) : ωS – KS ≥ 0   and   (IRB) : ωB – KB ≥ 0. (3) 
 
We will see that the threshold values of the fees KS = ωS and KB = ωB lead to the defection of 
both agents at the first step of the second stage. In spite of this, the middleman may have 
interest in choosing this policy because it would lead to high payoffs in case of a failure of the 
individual searches. However, the middleman has no interest in setting higher fees. Indeed 
setting a fee Ki > ωi leads to the defection of agent i at the last step of the game even if the 
individual searches were unsuccessful. This policy would lead to a shortfall in revenue for the 
middleman. In other words, setting KS > ωS or KB > ωB is a dominated strategy. It follows that 
looking for equilibrium paths, we can restrict the attention to the subgames where Ki ≤ ωi 
i = S,B and, consequently, to the subgames where after an unsuccessful matching at the first 
step, both agents sign with the middleman at the second step so that the game ends with the 
configuration (Y,Y).  
For the rest of the paper, in order to alleviate the notations, we design a particular 
scenario by its configuration at the first step without mentioning that, in case of an 
unsuccessful matching, both agents use the service of the middleman at the second step - e.g., 
the notation "(N,N) followed by (Y,Y)" is reduced to (N,N). 
 
3.1- BOTH AGENTS BEGIN WITH INDIVIDUAL SEARCH (CONFIGURATION (N,N)) 
Both agents search individually at the first step and, if they fail to match, use the 
intermediation services in a second step.  
The agents face the respective search costs eS2 and eB2. The matching is successful at the 
first step with a probability (eS + eB). In case of a failure, both agents have to wait for the 
second step to get some revenue which is then reduced by the amount of the commission paid 
to the middleman. We note ПS(N,N) and ПB(N,N) the profits of the seller and of the buyer in this 
configuration (N,N): 
 
Пi(N,N)(eS,eB,Ki) = (eS + eB) ωi + δ (1 – (eS + eB)) (ωi – Ki) – ei2    i = S,B.  (4) 
 
 
 
The variables eS and eB are strategically independent, so that the equilibrium is a 
dominant-strategy equilibrium: 
 
ei(N,N)(Ki) = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௘೔Пi(N,N)(eS,eB,Ki) = [(1 – δ)ωi + δ Ki] / 2    i = S,B. (5) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the bigger the potential gain ωi of the agent i and the higher the commission 
Ki paid to the middleman in case of a failure, the higher is the search intensity of this agent. 
On the other hand, search efforts correlate negatively with the discount factor. Indeed, a 
higher discount factor indicates that waiting for the second step to receive the individual 
payoff ωi – Ki is less costly. We note that for any Ki ≤ ωi we have 0 < ei(N,N)(Ki) ≤ ωi/2. This 
leads to 0 < Φ(eS(N,N) + eB(N,N)) ≤ 1/2 (recall that ωS + ωB = 1). Under the participation 
constraints (IRS) and (IRB), we thus identify an interior solution for the agents’ search efforts. 
 
Reporting (5) in (4) and using ωS + ωB = 1 give the equilibrium profits in the 
configuration (N,N) for i,j = S,B and i ≠ j  
 
Пi(N,N)(Ki,Kj) = [1 – ωj2 + 2δ(ωi – Ki – ωi(ωj – Kj)) + δ2(ωi – Ki)(ωi – Ki + 2(ωj – Kj))]/4.  (6) 
 
For each agent i = S,B, the equilibrium profits depend on the fees paid to the middleman and 
also on the fees paid by the other agent. The reason is that the search intensity of the latter is 
increasing in the fees that he pays. Hence, a high fee imposed to agent j increases the 
probability of a successful matching at the first step. Agent i can then receive his payoff with 
a higher probability from the first step. As a result, his expected profit is increased.17 
 
3.2- ONE AGENT DIRECTLY SIGNS WITH THE MIDDLEMAN AND THE OTHER 
SEARCHES ON HIS OWN ACCOUNT (CONFIGURATION (Y,N) OR (N,Y)) 
Consider the configuration in which the agent i, i = S or B, directly goes to the middleman 
and agent j, j ≠ i, begins searching on his own account. We note this configuration (Yi,Nj). 
The matching is successful at the first step with the probability (0 + ej) and then the 
payoff of agent j that searches is ωj – ej2. In case of a failure, agent j opts for the middleman’s 
services in a second step and obtains the payoff ωj – Kj. Agent i pays the fee Ki as soon as the 
matching is successful, yet this agent does not bear any search costs. More precisely, the 
profits are (for i,j = S,B and i ≠ j) 
 
Пi(Yi,Nj)(ej,Ki) = (0 + ej) (ωi – Ki) + δ (1 – (0 + ej)) (ωi – Ki). (7) 
 
 
 
Пj(Yi,Nj)(ej,Kj) = (0 + ej) ωj + δ (1 – (0 + ej)) (ωj – Kj) – ej2. (8) 
 
Solving for the agent j’s search intensity: 
 
ej(Yi,Nj)(Kj) = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௘ೕПj(Yi,Nj)(ej,Kj) = [(1 – δ)ωj + δ Kj] / 2. (9) 
 
Reporting (9) in (7) and (8) and using ωS + ωB = 1 give the equilibrium profits in the 
configuration (Yi,Nj) for i,j = S,B and i ≠ j 
 
Пi(Yi,Nj)(Ki,Kj) = (ωi – Ki)[ωj + δ(1 + ωi – (1 – δ)(ωj – Kj))]/2. (10) 
 
Пj(Yi,Nj)(Kj) = [ωj2 + 2δ (ωj – Kj)(2 – ωj) + δ2 (ωj – Kj)2]/4. (11) 
 
Observe that the profit of agent i who goes directly to the middleman depends on the fees Kj 
paid by the agent j who searches on his own account (see (10)). Again, the reason is that a 
high Kj increases the search intensity of agent j, and hence the probability of a successful 
match at the first step. As a result, the agent who directly goes to the middleman has an 
expected profit increasing in Kj. Yet, the profit of agent j, who begins searching on his own 
account depends only on the fees intended for him (see (11)). Indeed, the probability of a 
successful match at the first step only depends on agent j’s own search intensity. 
 
3.3- BOTH AGENTS DIRECTLY GO TO THE MIDDLEMAN (CONFIGURATION (Y,Y)) 
Both agents directly sign a contract with the middleman, aware that the latter will then 
succeed in matching them with certainty. In this context, the second stage consists of only one 
step. 
In this configuration (Y,Y) the respective profits of the seller and of the buyer are  
 
ПS(Y,Y)(KS) = ωS – KS   and   ПB(Y,Y)(KB) = ωB – KB. (12) 
 
4- THE EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIORS 
A necessary condition for a configuration to belong to an equilibrium path is that the 
individual choices of the seller and the buyer at the second stage are mutual best responses. 
The comparison between the individual profits in each of the four possible configurations 
leads to the three following lemmas.  
 
 
 
 
Lemma 1  
The configurations in which one of the agent directly goes to the middleman and the other 
searches on his own account (configuration (Y,N) or (N,Y)) cannot belong to an equilibrium 
path. 
 
Lemma 2  
The configuration in which both agents begin searching by themselves and then go to the 
middleman in the event of failure (configuration (N,N)) belong to an equilibrium path if and 
only if the individual rationality constraints (IRi): ωi – Ki ≥ 0, i = S,B are satisfied.  
 
Lemma 3  
The configuration in which both agents directly use the middleman’s services (configuration 
(Y,Y)) belong to an equilibrium path if and only if the two following incentive constraints are 
satisfied :  
 
(ICS): ПS(Y,Y)(KS) ≥ ПS(N,Y)(KS)      KS ≤ KSmax  (13) 
 
(ICB): ПB(Y,Y)(KB) ≥ ПB(Y,N)(KB)      KB ≤ KBmax  (14) 
 
with Kimax ≡ [– (1 – δ)(2 + δωi) + 2(1 – δ)1/2(1 – δ(1 – ωi))1/2] / δ2 < ωi   for i = S,B. 
 
Following Lemmas 1 to 3, an equilibrium with the configuration (N,N) on the 
equilibrium path always exists (under the individual rationality constraints) and a second 
equilibrium with the configuration (Y,Y) on the equilibrium path may exist, depending of the 
middleman’s decision at the first stage. The middleman then has to choose between two 
policies. (i) A resignation policy. Such policy consists of, for the middleman, implementing a 
unique equilibrium in which both agents search by themselves before using his services in the 
event of failure (configuration (N,N)). (ii) An incentive policy. In such a case, the middleman 
decides to implement a second equilibrium configuration in which both agents directly use his 
services (configuration (Y,Y)). 
 
4.1- THE RESIGNATION POLICY 
Under this policy, the fees KS and KB which maximize the middleman’s profit are determined 
by (see lemma 2 for the related constraints) 
 
 
 
ܯܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁୏౏,୏ా ПM(N,N)(KS,KB) = δ [1 – (eS(N,N)(KS) + eB(N,N)(KB))] (KS + KB) 
st.  (IRS): ωS – KS ≥ 0   and   (IRB): ωB – KB ≥ 0 
 
Solving for KS and KB gives KS = ωS and KB = ωB.18 The resulting profit is  
 
ПM(N,N)* = δ/2. (15) 
 
Unwinding the game, we obtain the search intensities of the agents and their respective profits 
on the equilibrium path: ei(N,N)* = ωi/2 and Пi(N,N)* = ωi(1 + ωj)/4 for i,j = S,B and i ≠ j. 
 
4.2- THE INCENTIVE POLICY 
Under this policy, the fees KS and KB which maximize the middleman’s profit are determined 
by (see lemma 3 for the related constraints) 
 
ܯܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁୏౏,୏ా ПM(Y,Y)(KS,KB) = KS + KB 
st.   (ICS): KS ≤ KSmax   and   (ICB): KB ≤ KBmax 
 
Clearly, the solution is KS = KSmax and KB = KBmax. The resulting profit is  
 
ПM(Y,Y)* = [– 4 + 3δ + δ2 + 2(1 – δ)1/2((1 – δ ωS)1/2 + (1 – δ ωB)1/2)] / δ2. (16) 
 
Unwinding the game, we obtain the respective profits of the agents on the equilibrium path: 
Пi(Y,Y)* = [2(1 – δ) + δ ωi – 2(1 – δ)1/2(1 – δ(1 – ωi))1/2] / δ2    i = S,B. 
 
4.3- THE POLICY CHOICE OF THE MIDDLEMAN 
At the first stage, the middleman chooses between the resignation policy and the incentive 
policy by comparing the profits ПM(N,N)* et ПM(Y,Y)*. Examining the sign of the difference 
Δ(δ,ωS,ωB) ≡ ПM(N,N)* – ПM(Y,Y)* leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Whatever the relative bargaining powers of agents, the middleman resigns himself to 
letting the parties begin searching by themselves if δ > 0.94; yet, he incites both agents to 
directly use his services if δ < 0.88. If the discount factor is such that 0.88 < δ < 0.94, the 
incentive policy is still preferred as long as the distribution of the bargaining powers is not 
too asymmetric. 
 
 
 
The figure 1 illustrates the proposition 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The economic rationale of the results is as follows. The middleman can implement a 
second equilibrium configuration in which both agents forgo searching by themselves and 
decide to directly go to the middleman (configuration (Y,Y)). This requires the setting of the 
fees at KSmax and KBmax. Those fees are low enough for any agent’s best response to be to 
directly sign with the middleman if the other agent chooses this option. The relevance of such 
a policy is evaluated through the comparison between the shortfall which stems from the 
decrease of the fees KS and KB and the benefit related to the absence of individual searches. 
The result crucially depends on the discount factor δ. Indeed, as is illustrated below, two 
effects combine in order for the difference ПM(N,N)* – ПM(Y,Y)* to be increasing in δ. 
First of all, we consider the configuration (N,N) in which both agents search on their 
own account at the first step and, if they failed to match, use the intermediation services in a 
second step. We showed that the search intensities of agents are decreasing in the discount 
factor δ. The likelihood of a failure at the first step, which leads to a payoff for the middleman 
at the second step, is then increasing in δ. We note that this positive effect of a high δ on 
ПM*(N,N) is strengthened by the fact that a high discount factor means a high discounted 
expected payoff for the middleman.  
δ = 0.94 
1 1/2 
0 
The middleman chooses 
the Resignation policy 
The middleman chooses 
the Incentive policy 
Figure 1: The policy choice of the middleman 
ωS
δ < 0.88 
δ = 0.88 
Δ(δ,ωS,(1 - ωS)) 
 
 
We now consider the configuration (Y,Y), subject to compliance with the incentive 
constraints (ICS) et (ICB). The role of these constraints is to assure that the profits 
Пi(Y,Y)(Ki) = ωi – Ki, i = S,B (which are independent of δ) are respectively higher than the 
profits ПS(N,Y)(KS) and ПB(Y,N)(KB) given at (11). In fact, these profits are each increasing in 
δ.19 This leads the fees KSmax and KBmax able to incite agents to sign directly with the 
middleman to be decreasing in the discount factor. For the middleman, this means that the 
shortfall which stems from the decrease of the fees KS and KB is increasing in the discount 
factor. 
In sum, ПM(N,N)* is increasing in δ and ПM(Y,Y)* is decreasing in δ. This explains why 
the incentive policy is not relevant for the middleman if the discount factor is too high. 
Finally, we point out that the policy choice of the middleman also depends on the 
relative bargaining powers of agents. For a given δ, the curve Δ(δ,ωS) is U-shaped formed. 
The explanation of this result is as follows: an increase dωS of the seller’s bargaining power 
raises his profit ПS(Y,Y)(KS) by dωS and increases his profit ПS(N,Y)(KS) of a lower amount 
since, with a positive probability, the seller needs to wait for the second step to be 
successfully matched (see (8)). It follows that the bigger the bargaining power ωS of the seller 
the easier is the respect of the incentive constraint (ICS). Hence, an increase of ωS from 0 to ½ 
tips the scale in favor of the incentive policy. However, as ωS increases, ωB decreases and a 
symmetric reasoning applies for the buyer. The lower the buyer’s bargaining power ωB, the 
more difficult is the respect of the incentive constraint (ICB). A decrease of ωB from ½ to 0, 
i.e. an increase of ωS from ½ to 1, tips the scale in favor of the resignation policy. 
 
5- THE INTRODUCTION OF A LEGAL RULE 
We first analyze the impact on the equilibrium behaviors of a legal rule that lays down the 
party which is compelled to pay the commission to the intermediary. Then, we assess the 
consequences of such a rule with regards to its impact on the collective surplus of the three 
participants. 
 
5.1- THE EFFECTS OF THE RULE ON THE EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIORS 
Setting a rule that determines who should pay the middleman’s commission will simply result 
in imposing a constraint KS = 0 or KB = 0 to the fees to be chosen by the middleman at the 
first stage of the game. The lemma 1 was established for any KS and KB; the results then still 
 
 
hold. It follows that the resignation and the incentive policies still are the two policies to be 
examined.  
 
5.1.1- THE RESIGNATION POLICY UNDER THE LEGAL CONSTRAINT 
We consider the legal rule "the agent i (i = S or B) must be the payer of the middleman". 
Setting Kj = 0 (j = S or B and j ≠ i) in (5) gives the search intensities of both agents under this 
legal rule 
 
e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ(Ki) = [(1 – δ)ωi + δ Ki]/2   and   e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ = (1 – δ)ωj/2   i,j = S or B and j ≠ i. (17) 
 
Notice that agent j retains a positive search intensity despite the fact that he can use the 
middleman’s services at no cost. Indeed, retaining ej > 0 enables this agent to reduce the 
probability to obtain his payoff only at the second step. Thus, the more impatient agent j (the 
lower δ), the higher is this search intensity.  
For the resignation policy under legal rule, the amount Ki which maximizes the 
middleman profit is determined by (see lemma 2 for the first constraint)  
 
ܯܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁୏౟ П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ(Ki) = δ [1 – (e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ(Ki) + e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ)] Ki  
st.  (IRi): ωi – Ki ≥ 0   and    Kj = 0    i,j = S or B and j ≠ i. 
 
The solution is Ki = ωi.20 The resulting profit is  
 
П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* = (δ/2) – δ[ωj (1 – δωi)]/2   for i,j = S or B and j ≠ i. (18) 
 
The result (18) is not surprising. The legal constraint reduces the set of contracts 
available to the middleman and thus penalizes the latter: П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* < ПM(N,N)* = δ/2. 
Unwinding the game with Ki = ωi and Kj = 0 gives the search intensities of the agents, 
e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωi/2  and  e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωj(1 – δ)/2, and their respective profits: П୧௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* = ωi[ωi + 
2(1 – δ)ωj]/4  and  П୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωj[1 + ωi + δ(2 + δωj)]/4  for i,j = S or B and j ≠ i. 
 
5.1.2- THE INCENTIVE POLICY UNDER THE LEGAL RULE 
The incentive constraints without legal rule are given at Lemma 3. Let us examine the 
incentive constraints ሺܫܥ௜ሻ௄ೕୀ଴ and ሺܫܥ௝ሻ௄ೕୀ଴ under the legal rule. Observe that Kimax given at 
 
 
Lemma 3 is independent of Kj. So, for agent i who pays the middleman, the constraint 
ሺܫܥ௜ሻ௄ೕୀ଴ is similar to the constraintሺܫܥ௜ሻ. Likewise, Kjmax only depends on Kj. So, the 
incentive constraint ሺܫܥ௝ሻ௄ೕୀ଴ of agent j is similar to the constraint ሺܫܥ௝ሻ and this constraint 
always holds if Kj = 0.  
 
It follows that the fee Ki set by the middleman for the incentive policy under the legal 
rule Kj = 0 is determined by 
 
ܯܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁୏౟ П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ (Ki) = Ki     st.  ሺܫܥ௜ሻ௄ೕୀ଴: Ki ≤ Kimax 
 
Clearly, the solution is Ki = Kimax. The resulting profits are for i,j = S or B and i ≠ j 
 
П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ* = Kimax = [– (1 – δ)(2 + δωi) + 2(1 – δ)1/2(1 – δ(1 – ωi))1/2] / δ2. (19) 
 
Unwinding the game, we obtain the respective profits of each agent (for i,j = S or B and 
i ≠ j): П୧௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ* = [2(1 – δ) + δωi – 2(1 – δ)1/2(1 – δ(1 – ωi))1/2] / δ2  and  П୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺ௒,௒ሻ* = ωj.  
 
5.1.3- THE EFFECTS OF THE LEGAL RULE ON THE POLICY CHOICE OF THE 
MIDDLEMAN 
Finally, we consider the choice of the middleman at the first stage. The middleman opts for 
the resignation policy or the incentive policy depending on the sign of the difference 
Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS,ωB) ≡ П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* – П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ*.  
From the comparison of the sign of Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS,ωB) with the sign of Δ(δ,ωS,ωB) ≡ 
ПM(N,N)* – ПM(Y,Y)*, we can establish the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 4  
Introducing the legal constraint Kj = 0 (j = S or B) reduces the parameter space from which 
the middleman chooses an incentive policy able to induce agents to directly use his services.  
 
The intuition of this result is as follows. Imposing Kj = 0 (j = S or B), the legal rule reduces 
the commission taken out by the middleman. The drop of his revenue is Kj = ωj in the 
resignation policy case and Kj = Kjmax in the incentive policy one. We have Kjmax ≤ ωj. The 
result of the Lemma 4 may then seem surprising. However, the drop of Kj also has an indirect 
effect within the resignation policy framework as it reduces the search intensity of agent j. 
 
 
Here, the drop of Kj from ωj to zero reduces the search intensity of agent j of δωj/2.21 The 
probability of a failure of the matching at the first step increases accordingly. As a result, the 
middleman obtains Kj with a higher probability. This indirect positive effect cannot recoup the 
drop of Kj (the legal rule reduces the profit of the middleman). Yet, when the latter chooses 
between the two policies, this effect can compensate for the fact that the revenue drop within 
the resignation policy (Kj = ωj) is higher than the revenue drop within the incentive policy 
(Kj = Kjmax). It follows that, starting from a situation where ПM(Y,Y)* > ПM(N,N)*, introducing 
the legal rule can lead to a situation where П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ* < П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* for an unchanged parametric 
space. 
This possibility is illustrated in the figure 2. The middleman opts for the incentive 
policy in the absence of a regulation and switches to the resignation policy when the legal rule 
is introduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2- THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A LEGAL RULE 
The benchmark situation is that in which the middleman is not subject to any regulation. We 
analyze the changes in collective surplus generated by the introduction of a legal rule 
designating the payer of the middleman. 
0 
ПM(N,N) 
ПM(Y,Y) 
ПM 
KS + KB 
Kimax KSmax + KBmax ωi ωS + ωB 
Figure 2: The effect of the rule on the middleman’s policy 
Legal rule 
No rule
 
 
5.2.1- THE EFFECTS OF THE LEGAL RULE ON THE INCENTIVE POLICY 
The incentive policy implements the match from the first step. Agents don’t bear any search 
costs as they directly go to the middleman. The match provides a payoff of one monetary unit 
shared between the seller, the buyer, and the middleman. As a result, the social welfare 
associated to this incentive policy is maximum:22 
 
W(Y,Y)* = 1 (20) 
 
If the legal rule does not lead the middleman to give up the incentive policy (when he 
did opt for this policy), the maximum level of welfare W(Y,Y)* = 1 is not affected by the 
introduction of the rule. The legal rule only affects the sharing of the maximum surplus. Yet, 
introducing a legal rule which restrains the set of policies available to the middleman may 
change the policy choice of the latter. This is the result pointed out in the Lemma 4. Using the 
Lemma, the following proposition is straightforward 
 
Proposition 2 
Introducing a legal constraint reduces the parameter space for which a subgame 
perfect equilibrium that implements the maximal social welfare exists.  
 
The interpretation of Proposition 2 and that of Propositions 3 and 4 in the next sub-
section is postponed to Section 5.2.3. 
 
5.2.2- THE EFFECTS OF THE LEGAL RULE ON THE RESIGNATION POLICY 
Under the resignation policy, the matching is successful with a probability (eS + eB). In case 
of a failure, the three participants need to wait for the second step to obtain the collective 
payoff of one monetary unit. In addition, the agents bear the search costs eS2 and eB2. Hence, 
the social welfare associated to the resignation policy can then be written:23 
 
W(N,N) = (eS + eB) + δ (1 – (eS + eB)) – eS2 – eB2.  (21) 
 
Using ei(N,N)* = ωi/2 for i = S,B gives the social welfare in the absence of a legal rule 
 
W(N,N)* = [1 + 2δ + 2 ωS ωB] / 4. (22) 
 
 
 
Using e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωi/2 and e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωj(1 – δ)/2 gives the social welfare under the legal 
rule "the agent i must be the payer of the middleman" 
 
W௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* = [1 + 2δ + 2 ωS ωB + δωj(δ(1 + ωi) – 2ωi)] / 4    for i,j = S or B and i ≠ j. (23) 
 
Observe that W௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* = W(N,N)* + [δωj (δ(1 + ωi) – 2ωi) ]/4. Hence, the legal rule "the 
agent i must be the payer of the middleman" is welfare improving if the term between 
brackets is positive i.e. if  
 
δ > δ௄ೕୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωi) ≡ 2ωi / (1 + ωi)    for i,j = S or B and i ≠ j. (24) 
 
We consider the best legal rule as the one which leads to a welfare increase for the 
largest parameter space. This parameter space is defined by the minimum acceptable value of 
the discount factor δ. Note that this minimum value δ௄ೕୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωi) increases with ωi. As a result, 
the smaller ωi (the smaller the bargaining power of the agent designated as the payer) the 
larger is the parameter space for which the welfare is increased. Then the following 
proposition is straightforward. 
 
Proposition 3 
In the process of choosing between the two rules: "the seller pays the commission" and 
"the buyer pays the commission", the best legal rule is to designate the agent with the lesser 
bargaining power to pay the middleman’s commission. 
 
However, imposing the best policy does not ensure that social welfare is increased. 
First, we know from Proposition 2 that introducing a legal constraint reduces the parameter 
space for which the middleman chooses an incentive policy and as a result reduces the 
parameter space for which there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium that implements the 
maximal social welfare. Moreover, we see below that the welfare can be reduced even when 
the middleman uses the resignation policy which implements a unique equilibrium with the 
configuration (N,N) on the equilibrium path. More precisely, we must distinguish: 
 
- When 0 < ωS < ½, the best policy is to set KB = 0. The welfare is increased if δ > δ௄ಳୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωS). 
The lower bound is an increasing function of ωS, and takes the maximal value δ = 2/3 at the 
 
 
upper value of ωS (ωS = 1/2). It follows that setting KB = 0 is welfare improving if δ > 2/3. If 
δ < 2/3, the welfare is improved if and only if δ > δ௄ಳୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωS)  ωS < δ/(2 – δ).   
 
- When ½ < ωS < 1, the best policy is to set KS = 0. The welfare is increased if δ > δ௄ೄୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωB). 
The lower bound is an increasing function of ωB, that is to say a decreasing function of ωS 
(recall that ωS + ωB = 1), and takes the maximum value δ = 2/3 at the lower value of ωS 
(ωS = 1/2). It follows that setting KS = 0 is welfare improving if δ > 2/3. If δ < 2/3, the welfare 
is improved if and only if δ > δ௄ೄୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωB)  ωB < δ/(2 – δ)  ωS > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ). 
 
The following proposition covers these results. 
 
Proposition 4 
Under the resignation policy which implements a unique equilibrium where both agents 
begin individual searching on their own account, we have: (a) Imposing a legal rule which 
corresponds to the best policy is welfare improving if δ > 2/3 or if δ < 2/3 and if the 
distribution of bargaining powers is very asymmetric. (b) If δ < 2/3 and if the bargaining 
powers are comparable, that is to say if δ/(2 – δ) < ωS < 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ), the best legal policy 
is welfare decreasing. 
 
The figure 3 illustrates the proposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3- INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
Proposition 2 states that the introduction of a legal constraint reduces the parameter space for 
which a subgame perfect equilibrium that implements the maximum social welfare exists. 
This result is not surprising if we compare what would be the aim of a welfare maximizer to 
the objective of the middleman. A welfare maximizer is better off when agents do not search 
by themselves in order to avoid the social costs of the individual search. For a given 
parameter space, the middleman prefers to motivate the two agents not to search by 
themselves by setting low fees since this policy generates a higher profit in spite of the costs 
of the incentives. In this context, the welfare maximizer and the middleman share the same 
aim, even if the motives differ. Limiting the possible policy choices of the middleman with a 
δ௄ೄୀ଴௠௜௡ (1 - ωS) δ௄ಳୀ଴௠௜௡ (ωS) 
1/2 
2/3 
δ 
1 
1 0 
ωS 
            The seller pays principle increases the welfare. 
            The buyer pays principle increases the welfare. 
            Setting any principle decreases the welfare. 
 
Figure 3: The effect of the legal rule on welfare 
 
 
legal constraint can lead the latter to abandon the incentive policy. This can only result in a 
drop of welfare. 
 
Let us now provide the intuition behind proposition 3. Within the resignation policy, the legal 
rule which designates agent i (i = S or B) to pay the middleman’s commission reduces the 
search effort of agent j who is exempted from payment. The impact on social welfare is 
twofold. Indeed, the search costs drop, but the probability that the matching is only successful 
at the second step increases.  
The legal rule reduces the search intensity of agent j from ωj/2 to (ωj/2 – δωj/2). So the 
probability that the matching is only successful at the second step increases of δωj/2. The 
negative impact on social welfare is then (1 – δ)δωj/2. We note that this social loss is linearly 
increasing with ωj. On the other hand, the fall of ej from ωj/2 to (ωj/2 – δωj/2) reduces the 
search costs of agent j of (2 – δ)δωj2/4. We check that, with increasing marginal search cost, 
the higher the initial search intensity ej(N,N)* = ωj/2, the greater is the cost decrease for the 
same "drop" δωj/2 of ej. But the initial search intensity is increasing with ωj. As a 
consequence, the best policy is that which implements a drop to the search intensity of the 
agent with the higher bargaining power. In other words, the best policy consists in designating 
the agent with the lesser bargaining power to pay the middleman’s commission. 
 
Finally, we interpret proposition 4. We assume ωi < ωj (which implies ωj > ½). In this case, 
the best policy designates the agent i to pay. Using the results just above, we know that this 
policy is welfare increasing if the social loss (1 – δ)δωj/2 due to the fall in the probability of a 
successful match at the first step is compensated by the search costs savings (2 – δ)δωj2/4. 
This is the case if ωj > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ).24 The aforementioned analysis still applies. The social 
loss is linearly increasing with ωj whereas the cost drop increases at an increasing rate with ωj. 
The bargaining power ωj of agent j needs to be high enough for the cost drop to compensate 
the social loss related to the matching probability. If it is not the case, that is to say if the 
difference in the relative bargaining powers is not sufficiently large (recall that ωj > ½), 
welfare is reduced. In other terms, welfare is reduced if the distribution of bargaining powers 
of the agents is not asymmetric enough.  
The role played by the discount factor remains decisive. Let us consider the condition 
ωj > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ) under which the legal rule is welfare improving (see footnote 23). The 
higher δ, the less binding is this condition since the minimal bound is decreasing with δ. The 
explanation is as follows. Agent j who is not compelled to pay the middleman, yet chooses a 
 
 
positive search intensity. Indeed, retaining ej > 0 enables this agent to reduce the probability 
to receive his payoff only at the second step. The higher the discounted value of the payoff in 
the second step (the higher δ), the lower is the level of ej chosen by agent j. It follows that the 
reduction of the search intensity of agent j and its positive impact on social welfare are 
increasing with δ. On the other hand, the reduction of the search intensity of agent j leads to 
an increase of the probability that the matching is only successful at the second step and in 
turn a reduction of social welfare. However, the higher the discount factor, the lesser is the 
negative impact generated by a lag period. Hence, if the value δ is high enough the two effects 
combine in order for the best policy to increase the welfare. As quoted above, this is the case 
if ωj > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ) or, equivalently, if δ > 2(1 – ωj)/(2 – ωj). 
The minimal bound of δ is decreasing with ωj and takes the value 2/3 when ωj takes its 
lower bound ωj = ½ (recall that ωi < ωj implies ωj > ½). It follows that for δ > 2/3 the 
condition is always satisfied. Hence, using the best policy increases the social welfare 
regardless the bargaining powers of agents if δ > 2/3, that is to say if agents are not too 
impatient to conclude the transaction. 
 
6- CONCLUSION  
We addressed the current debate regarding the principle which should prevail in the way sport 
middlemen are remunerated: "agent-paid-by-player" or "agent-paid-by-club". This paper 
shows that the question of the appropriateness of imposing an additional rule in the legal 
framework is a preliminary issue. More precisely, our results indicate that the most 
appropriate measure consists in designating that the party with the lesser bargaining power be 
the payer of the sports agent’s commission. However, imposing the best rule is welfare 
improving only if the discount factor is relatively high or if the distribution of bargaining 
powers between the club and the player is very asymmetric. So, completing the legal 
framework may not be relevant. It follows that the question has to be addressed at each 
leagues level, taking into account the prevailing conditions on the labor market of 
professional athletes. This would go beyond the scope of our article, though it seems that we 
can observe a shift of the bargaining power in favor of players, both in the US and in Europe. 
Indeed, in the North-American leagues, stronger player unions and the advent of salary 
disclosure improved the bargaining power of players (Mason, 2006). In Europe, the removal 
of transfer fees and the potential severance notice consecutive to the "Bosman" case have 
given players significant bargaining power to increase their earnings (Magee, 2002). 
 
 
Nevertheless, we argue that this bargaining power shift has to be put into perspective given 
the duality of the supply side of the labor market. In fact while superstars can extract great 
salaries thanks to the new structure of sport markets, average interchangeable players are still 
dominated by clubs in the negotiation of playing contracts. 
It is worth pointing out that we considered a very stylized matching problem involving 
only two agents and one intermediary. The simplicity of the framework is attractive because it 
helps explicitly characterizing all equilibrium solutions and giving for each of them the 
underlying economic intuitions. But this simplicity might be criticized on a main point. In 
fact, the only role we offer to the intermediary in our model is the matchmaking of the two 
parties. Nevertheless, empirically, a sport agent faces several clubs and several players. Thus, 
the latter not only matches players and clubs but also determines the allocation of the different 
players to the different clubs. Imposing an additional rule in the legal framework will also 
affect the intermediary’s incentives in this allocation process. Thus, this particular aspect of 
the problem needs to be addressed in future research. 
 
_______________________________________ 
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19 ߲Пj(Yi,Nj)(Kj)/߲δ = (ωj – Kj)(2 – ωj + δ(ωj – Kj))/2 ≥ 0 under (IRj): ωj – Kj ≥ 0 for j = S,B. 
20 Using (17) and ωS + ωB = 1, the objective function can be written: 
П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ(Ki) = δ Ki [1 + δ (1 – Ki)] / 2. We have ߲П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ(Ki)/߲Ki = δ[1 + δ(1 – 2Ki)]/2 which is 
positive for all Ki ≤ ωi < 1. So, the constraint (IRi) is binding at the solution. 
21 Recall that ej(N,N)* = ωj/2 and e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ* = ωj(1 – δ)/2. 
22 More conventionally: W(Y,Y)* = ПS(Y,Y)* + ПB(Y,Y)* + ПM(Y,Y)* = 1. 
23 Again, more conventionally: W(N,N) = ПS(N,N) + ПB(N,N) + ПM(N,N). 
24 Welfare is increased if (2 – δ)δωj2/4 > (1 – δ)δωj/2  ωj > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ). Note that if agent j with 
ωj > ½ is the seller, we are back to the condition ωS > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ). If he is the buyer, we are back to 
the condition ωB > 2(1 – δ)/(2 – δ)  ωS < δ/(2 – δ). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
1- PROOF OF LEMMA 1 
Recall that, as we explained at the beginning of section 3, setting fees that do not 
comply with individual rationality constraints (IRi) i = S,B is a dominated strategy for the 
middleman. It follows that looking for equilibrium paths, we can restrict the attention to the 
subgames where Ki ≤ ωi i = S,B. 
- The configuration (Y,N) can belong to an equilibrium path only if the choice Y of the seller 
and the choice N of the buyer are mutual best responses, that is to say only if 
ПS(Y,N)(KS,KB) ≥ ПS(N,N)(KS,KB)   and   ПB(Y,N)(KB) ≥ ПB(Y,Y)(KB). 
In order to prove that this configuration does not belong to an equilibrium path, we just need 
to prove that the first condition is not satisfied at the equilibrium i.e. that 
 
ΩS(KS,KB) ≡ ПS(N,N)(KS,KB) – ПS(Y,N)(KS,KB) > 0 for all (KS,KB) satisfying (IRi) i = S,B. (25) 
 
Using ПS(N,N)(KS,KB) given in (6) and ПS(Y,N)(KS,KB) given in (10), we have 
 
ΩS(KS,KB) = [1 – ωB(ωB + 2(ωS – KS)) – 2δ(ωS(ωS – KS) + KS(ωB – KB)) + δ2(ωS – KS)2]/4 and 
 
∂ΩS(KS,KB)/∂δ = [KS KB – KS ωB – ωS(ωS – KS) + δ(ωS – KS)2]/2.  
 
We replace the product KSKB by the product KSωB, with ωB ≥ KB according to (IRB). It 
follows that ∂ΩS(KS,KB)/∂δ is lower than 
 
 
 
[KS ωB – KS ωB – ωS(ωS – KS) + δ(ωS – KS)2]/2 = – [ωS(ωS – KS) – δ(ωS – KS)2]/2 < 0. 
 
So ΩS(KS,KB) is decreasing in δ. At the upper bound of δ (δ = 1), ΩS(KS,KB) takes the 
value [KS(KS + 2 KB)]/4 > 0. It follows that ΩS(KS,KB) > 0 for all (KS,KB) satisfying (IRi) 
i = S,B. 
 
- The configuration (N,Y) can belong to an equilibrium path only if  
ПS(N,Y)(KS) ≥ ПS(Y,Y)(KS)   and   ПB(N,Y)(KS,KB) ≥ ПB(N,N)(KS,KB). 
In order to prove that this configuration does not belong to an equilibrium path, we only have 
to prove that the second inequality cannot hold at the equilibrium i.e. that 
 
ΩB(KS,KB) ≡ ПB(N,N)(KS,KB) – ПB(N,Y)(KS,KB) > 0 for all (KS,KB) satisfying (IRi) i = S,B.  (26) 
 
ΩB(KS,KB) is given by permuting the subscripts S and B into ΩS(KS,KB). Then, using 
the same method as above, the proof is straightforward. 
 
2- PROOF OF LEMMA 2 
The configuration (N,N) can belong to an equilibrium path if and only if  
ПS(N,N)(KS,KB) ≥ ПS(Y,N)(KS,KB)   and   ПB(N,N)(KS,KB) ≥ ПB(N,Y)(KS,KB). 
By (25) and (26) we know this is the case for all (KS,KB) under (IRi): ωi – Ki ≥ 0, i = S,B. 
 
3- PROOF OF LEMMA 3  
The configuration (Y,Y) can belong to an equilibrium path if and only if  
ПS(Y,Y)(KS) ≥ ПS(N,Y)(KS)   and   ПB(Y,Y)(KB) ≥ ПB(Y,N)(KB). 
We note these conditions  
Ψi(Ki) ≡ Пi(Y,Y)(Ki) – Пi(Ni,Yj)(Ki) ≥ 0 for i = S and B, and j = S,B with j ≠ i. 
 
Using Пi(Y,Y)(Ki) given in (12) and Пi(Ni,Yj)(Ki) given in (11), we have 
 
Ψi(Ki) = (ωi – Ki) – [ωi2 + 2δ (ωi – Ki)(2 – ωi) + δ2 (ωi – Ki)2]/4  and 
 
∂Ψi(Ki)/∂Ki = – [(1 – δ)(2 + δ ωi) + δ2 Ki] / 2 < 0. 
 
So Ψi(Ki) is decreasing in Ki. When Ki takes its lower bound, we have Ψi(Ki = 0) = 
ωi(1 – δ)(4 – ωi(1 – δ))/4 > 0. Hence, the conditions Ψi(Ki) ≥ 0 for i = S,B can be written 
 
 
Ki ≤ Kimax where Kimax is the solution of Ψi(Kimax) = 0. The values Kimax for i = S,B are given 
in the lemma. 
Note that when Ki takes its upper bound we have Ψi(Ki = ωi) = – ωi2/4 < 0. It follows 
that Kimax < ωi for i = S and B and, consequently, the individual rationality constraints (IRS) 
and (IRB) are not binding in the configuration (Y,Y). 
 
Now, we want to prove a useful result for the remaining proofs of the appendix 
 
∂Kimax/∂δ < 0 for i = S and B. (27) 
 
Totally differentiating the equation Пi(Y,Y)(Kimax) – Пi(Ni,Yj)(Kimax) = 0 and noting that 
∂Пi(Y,Y)(Ki)/∂δ = 0, we obtain ∂Kimax/∂δ = – [– ∂Пi(Ni,Yj)/∂δ / ∂Ψi(Ki)/∂Ki]. We have 
∂Пi(Ni,Yj)/∂δ = (ωi – Kimax)(2 – ωi + δ(ωi – Kimax)) / 2 > 0 and we have proved just above that 
∂Ψi(Ki)/∂Ki < 0, hence ∂Kimax/∂δ < 0. 
 
4- PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Consider the difference Δ(δ,ωS,ωB) ≡ ПM(N,N)* – ПM(Y,Y)* where ПM(N,N)* is given in (15) and 
ПM(Y,Y)* is given in (16). Using ωS + ωB = 1 we obtain Δ(δ,ωS) 
 
Δ(δ,ωS) = (δ/2) – [– 4 + 3δ + δ2 + 2(1 – δ)1/2((1 – δ ωS)1/2 + (1 – δ(1 – ωS))1/2)] / δ2  and 
 
∂Δ(δ,ωS)/∂ωS = (1 – δ)[1/((1 – δ)(1 – δωS))1/2 – (1/((1 – δ)(1 – δ(1 – ωS)))1/2)] / δ. 
 
The derivative is negative [positive] if (1 – δ)(1 – δωS) is higher [lower] than (1 – δ)(1 – 
δ(1 – ωS)) i.e. if ωS is lower [higher] than 1/2. It follows that for δ given, the curve Δ(δ,ωS) is 
U-shaped formed and takes its minimum value at ωS = ½. 
Note that for δ = 0.94 we have Δ(δ,ωS = ½) = 0 and that for δ = 0.88 we have 
Δ(δ,ωS = 0) = Δ(δ,ωS = 1) = 0. 
Let us now consider the role played by the discount factor δ in the difference Δ(δ,ωS). 
We have ∂ПM(N,N)*/∂δ = ½ > 0 and ∂ПM(Y,Y)*/∂δ = ∂(KSmax + KBmax)/∂δ < 0 according to (27). 
So, the difference Δ(δ,ωS) increases in δ. It follows that for δ > 0.94, Δ(δ,ωS) > 0 for all ωS 
and that for δ < 0.88, Δ(δ,ωS) < 0 for all ωS. 
 
 
 
 
 
5- PROOF OF LEMMA 4 
Consider the difference Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS,ωB) ≡ П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* – П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ* where П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ* is given in 
(18) and П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ* is given in (19). We have ∂П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ*/∂δ = (1 – ωj + 2δωiωj)/2 > 0 and 
∂П୑௄ೕୀ଴ሺ௒,௒ሻ*/∂δ = ∂Kimax/∂δ < 0 by (27). So the difference Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS,ωB) increases in δ. Again, 
using ωS + ωB = 1, we obtain Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS).  
 
In the absence of regulation, from the proof of Proposition 1, we know that  
- If ωS = ½, Δ(δ,ωS) ≤ 0 for all δ ≤ 0.94.  
- If δ = 0.88, Δ(δ,ωS) ≤ 0 for all ωS.  
 
When the legal rule Kj = 0 is introduced, we have  
- If ωS = ½, Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS) = [16 – 12δ – 4δ2 + 2δ3 + δ4 – 8.21/2(2 – 3δ + δ2)1/2]/8δ2 which is 
negative only if δ < 0.86 < 0.94. 
- If δ = 0.88, Δ௄ೕୀ଴(δ,ωS) = 0.29 – 0.87(0.11 + 0.88ωS)1/2 + 0.96ωS – 0.39 ωS2 which is 
negative only if ωS < 0.17. 
 
So, introducing a legal constraint reduces the parameter space for which Δ(δ,ωS) < 0 i.e. the 
parameter space in which the middleman chooses an incentive policy.  
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Matching technology involving strategic interaction 
Let us consider the matching technology where the probability (eS,eB) of a match without 
the involvement of the middleman is (for ei ≥ 0 i = S,B) 
(eS,eB) = eS + eB + (eSäeB)/2  if  0 ≤ eS + eB + (eSäeB)/2 ≤ 1 and (eS,eB) = 1  if not. 
 
In the configuration (N,N) where both agents begin with individual search, the profits of 
the seller and of the buyer are: 
Пi(N,N)(eS,eB,Ki) = (eS,eB) ωi + δ (1 – (eS,eB)) (ωi – Ki) – ei2    i = S,B.  
The variables eS and eB are strategically interdependent in the sense that the optimal 
search intensity of one agent depends on the search intensity of the other agent. Specifically, 
the best response functions are: 
ei(N,N)(Ki,ej) = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௘೔Пi(N,N)(eS,eB,Ki) = (2 + ej)[(1 – δ)ωi + δ Ki]/4  i,j = S,B and i ≠ j. 
 
 
These functions are upward sloping because an increase in ej increases the productivity of ei 
and, consequently, gives an incentive to agent i to increase its effort. In other words, with the 
matching technology (eS,eB) efforts are strategic complements. 
Solving the system of best response functions, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in efforts 
for i,j = S,B and i ≠ j 
ei(N,N)(Ki,Kj) = 2[(1 - δ)ωi + δKi][4 + (1 - δ)ωj + δKj] / [16 – [(1 - δ)ωi + δKi][(1 - δ)ωj + δKj]] 
 
For the resignation policy, the fees KS and KB which maximize the middleman’s profit are 
determined by (see lemma 2 for the related individual rationality constraints):  
ܯܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁୏౏,୏ా ПM(N,N)(KS,KB) =  
 δ [1 – (eS(N,N)(KS,KB) + eB(N,N)(KS,KB) + eS(N,N)(KS,KB) ä eB(N,N)(KS,KB) / 2)] (KS + KB) 
st.  (IRS): ωS – KS ≥ 0   and   (IRB): ωB – KB ≥ 0 
 
The solution is not easy to characterize due to the shape of the objective function which 
is parametrized by the value of the discount factor δ. More precisely, if for low values of δ the 
shape of the objective function is such as both individual rationality constraints are binding, it 
is not the case for high values of the discount factor.  
We only present the results for the case where agents are symmetric (ωS = ωB = ½).  
 
- For low values of δ (δ < 0.52) the two constraints (IRi) i = S,B are binding and the 
middleman sets the fees KS = ½ and KB = ½ at the first stage of the game. The search 
intensities of the agents are (using ei(N,N)(Ki,Kj) above): ei(N,N)* = 2/7, i = S,B. 
 
- For δ > 0.52 two symmetric solutions exist: KS = ½ and KB = KB*(δ) or KS = KS*(δ) and 
KB = ½ where Ki*(δ) (i = S or B) decreases with the discount factor δ from the value ½ when 
δ = 0.52 to the value 0.27 when δ = 1. The search intensities of the agents ei(N,N)*(δ), i = S,B 
are decreasing functions of δ. The related analytical expressions are too cumbersome to be 
written down here. 
 
For the resignation policy under the legal rule Kj = 0 (j = S or B), the middleman sets 
the fees Kj = 0 and Ki = ωi = ½ (indeed, the shape of the objective function is such as the (IRi) 
constraint is binding for all values of δ when Kj = 0). The search intensities of the agents then 
become 
e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) = 2(9 – δ) / (63 + δ)   and   e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) = 18(1 – δ) / (63 + δ).  
 
 
 
As we explained in the equation (21) in the text, the social welfare associated to the 
resignation policy can then be written 
W(N,N) = (eS,eB) + δ (1 – (eS,eB)) – eS2 – eB2. 
Using ei(N,N)*(δ) for i = S,B gives the social welfare W(N,N)*(δ) in the absence of a legal 
rule (for δ < 0.52 and for δ > 0.52). Alternatively, using e୧௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) and e୨௄ೕୀ଴
ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) gives the 
social welfare W௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) under the legal constraint Kj = 0. In the case considered here where 
agents are symmetric (ωS = ωB = ½), the best legal rule - which must designate the agent with 
the lesser bargaining power as the payer of the middleman’s commission - can dictate 
indifferently that the buyer or the seller should be the payer of the middleman.  
We must analyze the impact of such a policy on the collective surplus of the three 
participants. We obtain W௄ೕୀ଴ሺே,ேሻ*(δ) > W(N,N)*(δ) whenever δ > 0.69. 
With a matching technology involving strategic interaction, we obtain the same result as 
with the additive function Φ(eS,eB): setting a regulation on matchmakers is welfare improving 
for high values of δ but the policy is welfare decreasing if the discount factor is low (see 
Figure  3 in the text). 
 
